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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
' -
I. Nature of the Case 
This action was brought by the Appellants seeking to eliminate an easement over 
the southeast corner of Lot 7 in Block 1 of Glassford Heights Subdivision. The easement 
at issue is attached as Exhibit "1" to Respondent Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed and 
states: 
Exhibit "1" 
105 Jones Lane 
This Warranty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of 
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit 2) over the Southeast comer of Lot 7 of 
Block 1 of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford 
Heights Sub. When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service 
provide a permanent access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot 
shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of 
written receipt thereof. 
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by 
the owner ( of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner ( of Lot 
8) to access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line 
( of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall 
remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 
8 from Jones Lane. The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of 
Access back to Lot 7 within one year or upon completion of the driveway, 
whichever occurs first. 
R. Vol. I, p. 13 (hereafter referred to as "Easement of Access"). A true and correct copy 
of Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed is included herewith as Addendum A. 
The Easement of Access can be separated into two distinct clauses: Paragraph 1 
and Paragraph 2. Paragraph 1 contains an express condition precedent, which is the 
acquisition of "permanent access" from either Blaine County or the United States Forest 
Service ("USFS") across USFS Lands to Lot 8. Within thirty days after receiving 
"permanent access" Lot 8 must quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7. It was, 
and remains, undisputed that Ms. Wescott has not received "permanent access", so no 
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duty has ansen under Paragraph 1. Appellant knew pnor to filing suit that no 
"permanent" access had ever been granted to Ms. Wescott across USFS lands. 
Paragraph 2 of the Easement of Access describes when the Easement of Access 
becomes effective, or like a light bulb, turned on. Until the owner of Lot 8 receives a 
written denial from the USFS, the Easement of Access is not effective, or is off. 
However, upon receipt of a written denial, the Easement of Access is turned on. Once 
on, the owner of Lot 8 may then access the property across the Easement of Access until 
Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. After the completion of 
a driveway from Jones Lane to Lot 8, Lot 8 must then quitclaim the Easement of Access 
to Lot 7. 
Appellants brought this action alleging (1) Respondent had abandoned the 
easement; (2) the 2007 USFS Easement obtained by Respondent was near permanent; 
and (3) the easement at issue was never "in effect," and therefore had somehow expired. 
The Appellants subsequently sought to amend the Complaint on the basis the owners of 
Lot 9, the Woodcocks, had obtained a USFS Easement in 2000 which was "permanent" 
and Ms. Wescott was an unnamed beneficiary of the 2000 Woodcock Easement. As 
shown below, the District Court rejected each of Appellants' arguments. 
Appellants' arguments below, and on appeal, intentionally choose to disregard the 
explicit terms of the Easement of Access, specifically the condition precedent to the 
Easement of Access coming into effect (i.e. the second paragraph) and the requirement 
for "permanent" access from either Blaine County or the USFS. 
Appellants' suggestion that this Court focus and interpret only portions of the 
second paragraph of the Easement of Access failed below, and the District Court 
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correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant. The District Court found the USFS 
"has not provided permanent access, that Blaine County is no longer in a position to 
provide any access, they cannot fulfill - one of those, that other condition cannot be 
fulfilled, and there has been no abandonment of the easement." Court's Rulings & 
Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 20:15-22 (March 30, 2014). 
II. Course of Proceedings 
Appellants correctly recite the Course of Proceedings to the point of the Summary 
Judgment. Appellant have chosen to cite only six small portions of the District Court's 
Rulings and Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, which argument was held on 
March 31, 2014. The entire oral ruling consists of 24 pages of comments by the District 
Court. The District Court found, as a matter of law, the USFS had not provided a 
permanent access across the USFS Lands, Blaine County cannot provide access to Ms. 
Wescott's property from Jones Lane, and there had been no abandonment of the 
Easement of Access. Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 
20:15-22 (March 30, 2014). 
After the grant of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of 
Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, on April 18, 2014 the Appellants filed a 
Motion to Amend Complaint based upon a separate easement granted by the USFS in 
August of 2000 to Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock (hereafter the "Woodcock 
Easement"). 
Appellants argued below the Woodcock Easement, though it references only 
Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock as the Grantee, also applies to Ms. Wescott because 
the title attached to the legal description, which was prepared by Galena Engineering, 
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Inc., states "PROPERTY DESCRIPTION A 33' WIDE EASEMENT TO ACCESS 
LOTS 8 & 9, GLASSFORD HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION." R. Vol. I, p. 20. 
The Appellants argued below, as here, that the Woodcock Easement satisfied the 
issue of permanent access to Ms. Wescott's property. The pertinent portion of the 
Woodcock Easement for the Appellants, and the only section focused on by the 
Appellants states "[t]his easement shall continue for as long as the property served is used 
for a single family residence." R. Vol. I, p. 121. The Woodcock Easement contains an 
unambiguous and expressly stated expiration date of December 31, 2029, which is 
completely disregarded by the Appellants. Id 
Respondent opposed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint on April 28, 2014. 
Respondent retained the services of Andrew Hawes, an expert witness, who opined the 
Woodcock Easement: (i) contains an expiration date; (ii) does not run with the land of 
Lot 8 of Glassford Heights Subdivision and is solely personal to the stated Grantees, 
Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock; and (iii) is subject to defeasement for a multitude of 
reasons. 
Just pnor to the hearing on May 5, 2014, the Appellants filed the Second 
Affidavit of Richard W. Mollerup, which states, among other things, his opinion is the 
Woodcock Easement "is a permanent easement benefiting or serving property including 
Lot 8 ... It does not appear to me that the words "Expiration Date: 12/31/2029" at the top 
left corner are part of the easement granted ... but an internal filing reference in which the 
expiration date was included in error. That expiration date is in direct conflict with 
Paragraph D of the [Woodcock Easement]." R. Vol. I., pp. 165-168. 
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On May 5, 2014 the District Court heard oral arguments. The District Court ruled 
from the bench. In the transcribed 20 page oral ruling the District Court found, among 
other things, the intent of the applicants for the Woodcock Easement does not matter, but 
rather, what the USFS actually did in granting an easement solely to the Woodcocks was 
critical to the legal analysis. Thereafter, the District Court entered its Order denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. R. Vol. I, p. 174. A trial was set for July 23, 2014, limited 
to the issue of equities. 
On July 14, 2014, the Appellants renewed their motion to amend complaint, 
asking the Court to consider the intent of the Woodcock Easement. The basis for their 
renewed motion was a disclosure of 109 pages of documents by Respondent. Appellants 
contended below, as they do here, the documents disclosed were important so the District 
Court could consider what the intent of the Woodcock Easement was. The Court denied 
the Appellants' renewed motion on July 23, 2014, consistent with the Court's legal 
analysis set forth in the transcript of the May 5, 2014 hearing and the March 31, 2014 
hearing. The Court conducted a trial limited to the equities. The District Court entered 
Judgment for the Respondent on August 25, 2014. This appeal was then taken. 
III. Statement of Facts 
In 1997, Leif Odmark owned Lots 7 and 8 which were undeveloped. R. Vol. I, p. 
138-139. The Woodcocks owned the adjacent Lot 9. R. Vol. I, p. 140. The address of 
Lot 8, the property subject to this litigation, was 105 Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 13. 
On July 14, 1998, the Woodcocks submitted a Special-Use Application and 
Report to the USFS requesting "a permanent easement for all-year residential purposes, 
including utilities and access, for Glassford Heights Subdivision, Lot 9, from the existing 
Bench Road, a public road maintained by Blaine County." R. Vol. I, p. 130. 
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On the same day, July 14, 1998, Mr. Odmark wrote to Mr. Nelson, the Regional 
Forester, expressing his support for a permanent easement to be issued to the Woodcocks. 
R. Vol. I, p. 234. 
On August 11, 1998 Linda S. Haavik, the Administrator for the Blaine County 
Planning and Zoning Building Department, wrote to Mr. Kurt Nelson, the Regional 
Forester, expressing support for the access easement to Lot 9 over USFS land. R. Vol. I, 
p. 141. Ms. Havvik also expressed the need for a driveway to be constructed from Jones 
Lane across wetlands. Id She further expressed concerns over the safety of access to 
Lot 9 from Jones Lane should a driveway be required to be installed. Id. She went on to 
express concern regarding access to Lot 8, stating "I have a concern over future access to 
the adjacent Lot 8, which the Woodcock's do not own. I believe that access to Lot 8 
should be allowed from the same easement that the Woodcock's are requesting if it is 
indeed improved." Id Since the Woodcock Easement had not been granted, the USFS 
had a concern over the trespass occurring over its property for access to Lots 8 and 9. Id 
While the Special Use Application and Report was pending before the USFS, Ms. 
Wescott and her former spouse purchased the property on April 14, 2000. R. Vol. I, pp. 
12-15. The Warranty Deed references the address of 105 Jones Lane, as platted access to 
Lot 8 was to be from Jones Lane off of State Highway 75. Id. 
Four months later, on August 3, 2000, recorded on August 15, 2000, the USFS 
granted a Forest Road Easement to Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock, the only grantees 
of the instrument. R. Vol. I, p. 121. The Woodcock Easement includes an expiration 
date on the first page of the easement of December 31, 2029. Id. In addition the 
Woodcock Easement references only a single property by stating "[t]his easement shall 
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continue for as long as the property served is used for a single family residence." Id. The 
Woodcock Easement Exhibit "A" references, in the title only, as "A 33' WIDE 
EASEMENT TO ACCESS LOTS 8 & 9." R. Vol. I, p. 125. 
Ms. Wescott and her former spouse developed Lot 8, built a home and 
constructed a driveway which was accessed via the Woodcock Easement. R. Vol. I, pp. 
60-70. During construction, Ms. Wescott also accessed her property from Jones Lane. 
Id. at 62. After Ms. Wescott's title company notified her she had no legal access to her 
property, Ms. Wescott obtained an easement from the USFS. Id. at 63. 
On May 15, 2007, recorded on May 22, 2007, the USFS granted a Forest Road 
Easement to Ann B. Wescott which included "a nonexclusive easement for use of a road" 
to access "Lot 8 of Block 1, Glassford Heights Subdivision" (hereafter the "Wescott 
Easement"). R. Vol. I, p. 16. The Wescott Easement states "[t]his easement shall expire 
on 12/31/2036." Id. 
On October 17, 2007, Michael Capener then owner of Lot 7, submitted an 
application to Blaine County for the vacation of Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 235. Jones 
Lane was platted to serve as access to Lots 8 and 9. R. Vol. I, p. 237. 
The Appellants acquired title to Lot 7 on or about January 11, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 
10. Sometime after the purchase of Lot 7, the Appellants became aware of Ms. Wescott's 
easement, and brought this action to quiet title to their property. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Respondent raises the following additional issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court erred by failing to find the Appellants' claims 
were pursued frivolously and without factual foundation, and whether the District Court 
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erred by failing to award Respondent attorney's fees based upon the frivolous nature of 
the Appellant's claims. 
2. Whether the Appellants' appeal is frivolous and without legal or factual 
foundation. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal 
pursuant to LC. §12-121. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Appropriate. 
a. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review of a lower court's grant of summary judgment is as 
follows: 
When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court 
applies the same standard used by the district court. Cristo Viene 
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
is on the moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 
625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). However, if the nonmoving party fails to 
provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or 
her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. Atwood v. Smith, 
143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006). This Court will liberally 
construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Cristo Viene, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 
746. Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 
(2003). 
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 402-03, 195 P.3d 1212, 1215-16 (2008). 
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Both the Appellants and the Respondent moved for summary judgment. The 
Appellants moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that (i) the Easement of Access 
never came into effect, (ii) the Easement of Access, if it came into effect, expired under 
its express terms, and (iii) Wescott abandoned the Easement of Access. 
Ms. Wescott moved for summary judgment on the basis that (i) the Wescott 
Easement from the USFS to Ms. Wescott is not permanent and (ii) Blaine County can no 
longer provide access to Lot 8 via Jones Lane. 
The parties fully briefed the motions, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2014. 
The pure legal issues framed in the summary judgment motions were: 1) whether Ms. 
Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USFS was "permanent;" and 2) whether Ms. Wescott 
had abandoned the Easement of Access by non-use. The Appellants were unable to 
establish the essential legal elements of their case and the Court appropriately granted 
summary judgment to Ms. Wescott. 
b. The District Court Never Found the Easement of Access Was 
Ambiguous and Interpreted the Easement of Access in Accord 
with Applicable Law. 
As admitted by the Appellants, the District Court never made an express finding 
that the Easement of Access was ambiguous. In fact Appellants admitted to the District 
Court that the "case is ripe for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for the 
reason that the document is clear and unambiguous." R. Vol. I, pp. 109-110. Appellants 
are judicially estopped from taking a contrary position. 
"Judicial estoppel takes into account ... what the [ estopped] party knew, or should 
have known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the 
party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is 
determinative as to whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court. Judicial 
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estoppel, however, should "only be applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent 
position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts 
prior to adopting the initial position." McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 895, 303 P.3d 
578, 582 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, it is unequivocal that Appellants read, fully understood, and represented to 
the District Court that the Easement of Access was unambiguous, and thus "ripe for entry 
of summary judgment." The District Court, in fact, interpreted the Easement of Access 
as a matter of law, with the plain language of the document, and without extrinsic 
evidence. 
The "[i]nterpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. On 
the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law. 
Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law." 
Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 
While the District Court stated: "I don't think I can look at any particular line and 
say this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result," the District 
Court never made an express finding that the Easement of Access was ambiguous. 
Transcript Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014, 
p. 2. L. 9-16. To determine whether a document is ambiguous, the Court must determine 
whether the document is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Delancey v. 
Delancey, 110 Idaho 63,714 P.2d 32 (1986). 
Appellants fault the District Court for not finding the Easement of Access 
ambiguous, however simply because the Appellants and the Respondent differ on the 
interpretation, does not make the Easement of Access ambiguous. Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 
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151 Idaho 790,264 P.3d 897 (2011) ("However, ambiguity is not present merely because 
the parties present differing interpretations to the court."). The District Court recognized 
that in order to determine whether the Easement of Access was ambiguous, the Easement 
of Access must be construed in its entirety. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525 
(2003). 
The Appellants contend the District Court failed to consider the Easement of 
Access in its entirety and failed to consider what the intent of the parties were as 
demonstrated by extrinsic evidence. Appellants' argument is incorrect and not supported 
by the record. The record clearly indicates the District Court reviewed the Easement of 
Access and determined as a matter of law what the intention of the parties was 
ascertainable from the Easement of Access' plain language, without the aid of extrinsic 
evidence. See Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636,315 P.3d 824 (2013). The District Court, 
in its review of the Easement of Access stated: 
The first -- well, the second sentence of the first paragraph, "When/If 
Blaine County and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent 
access across US Forest Service land to Lot 8," then there is a requirement 
that the owner shall quitclaim the easement back to Lot 7 within 30 days. 
And there are two conditions there. That is Blaine County has to act and 
the United States Forest Service has to act in order to fulfill those 
conditions and that triggers a 30-day requirement of the easement be 
handed back. If it stopped there, we wouldn't have any trouble. 
Then the easement goes on to say that this easement of access shall 
become in effect upon one condition, and that it shall remain in effect 
upon another condition. And that second one is until Blaine County 
agrees to allow access to Lot 8. The becoming in effect is triggered by the 
forest service denying access. Until then there is no easement. 
Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 2: 1 7-3: 10 (March 31, 
2014). The District Court continued its review of the Easement of Access and 
determined as a matter oflaw Ms. Wescott's 2007 Easement was not permanent nor had 
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the USFS provided permanent access. Id at 3: 11-14, 4:3-4. The District Court further 
determined as a matter of law Blaine County could be of no assistance in providing 
permanent access to Ms. Wescott's property given Blaine County's vacation of Jones 
Lane. Id at 4:5-8. 
The Court then reviewed the second paragraph of the Easement of Access further, 
stating "[t]his argument, the rest of this argument about whether it came into existence, 
came into effect, I think is trying to determine what paragraph two means." Id at 4: 13-
5 :3. The District Court ruled, as a matter of law, that Ms. Wescott had not abandoned the 
Easement of Access. Id at 5:4-6:23. The Appellants' assertion that the non-use of the 
Easement of Access was abandonment was rejected by the District Court. 
The District Court interpreted the intent of the Easement of Access as follows: 
Lot 8, excuse me, yes. Would be landlocked if access was not granted 
across Lot 7 to get to Bench Road. And my point is they recognized that 
problem and knew something had to be done about it and the something 
that had to be done about it was the creation of this easement. And it says, 
okay, if the forest service closes you off and you can't get a workable 
access to your lot from Blaine County, then you're going to have this 
easement. That to me is the overall and overriding intent of the easement 
The next question is, was it -- could it have a, I don't know, a yo-yo effect, 
a pull back, a string attached, a I'm just kidding? Could it mean that? I 
tend to agree with Mr. Trout. He said you can't -- when he said you can't 
ascribe a fraudulent intent to Mr. Odmark, or an illusory intent, I guess, 
might be another way to look at this, I have a tremendous amount of 
difficulty saying this easement is intended to be -- illusory is not the right 
word, but that's one that comes to mind -- by saying, here, you've got an 
easement if either of these two things happen, but just kidding, it all comes 
back in a year no matter what. Because the contemplation of the parties 
were that the forest service might or might not grant permanent access. 
Blaine County might or might not act. 
And it's very difficult for me to believe that the county is going to allow 
development of these two lots by taking a look at the language of this 
easement and saying, well, you really didn't give it any easement or you 
didn't give Lot 8 an easement when it appears that's what you did. We're 
going to let you develop these lots. Sure, you've provided for somebody 
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not being landlocked in the future, but then they get to come back and 
point to this provision and say, well, we fooled the county and you. We 
get that easement back within a year no matter what. I really have trouble 
reaching the conclusion that the easement was intended to come back 
within a year no matter what, or completion of the driveway. 
The only intent that I can ascribe to that is that if something didn't happen 
within a year, or excuse me, if something did happen, then within a year 
of that event, within a year of permanent access being granted by the 
forest service, or upon completion of the driveway, perhaps through Jones 
Lane, and I know that I am adding words that are not there in order to 
come up with these possible explanations, but to me that's the only thing 
that language could mean. 
Id at 7:1- 8:24. 
After reviewing the Easement of Access in its entirety, the District Court: (i) did 
not determine the Easement of Access was ambiguous; (ii) interpreted the Easement of 
Access with the circumstances in existence at the time the Easement of Access was 
granted; and (iii) without considering extrinsic evidence, determined the intention of the 
parties as a matter oflaw ascertained from the Easement of Access' plain language. 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent was legally 
correct, and supported by applicable law. 
c. The Appellants' Contention that the District Court Should 
Consider Additional Documents is Improper. 
The Appellants argue the District Court failed to consider the circumstances 
existing at the time the Easement of Access was drafted. In support of this argument, the 
Appellants point to documents that predate the grant of the Easement of Access. 
Appellants argue the District Court should have considered: (i) the Special Use Permit 
Application, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 1; (ii) the Blaine County letter to the USFS, 
Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 2; (iii) Odmark's letter to the USFS, Appellants' Trial 
Exhibit No. 6; (iv) the USFS News Release, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 8; (v) the 
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Woodcock Easement, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 4, and; (vi) the Staff Report to the 
Blaine County Board of Commissioners, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 7. 
As discussed above, the District Court did not find the Easement of Access was 
ambiguous. Had it done so, the District Court could have looked to extrinsic evidence, 
however the District Court determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law from the 
plain language of the Easement of Access. These documents have no bearing on the 
single document subject to interpretation in this matter, the Easement of Access. 
Furthermore, these documents were not before the Court at the Summary 
Judgment hearing and weren't before the Court until Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Complaint filed on April 18, 2014. R. Vol. I, pp. 111-125, 130-142. The Appellants 
never filed a motion for reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its ruling. 
The District Court's ruling on Summary Judgment was appropriate and was 
based, in part, on the representation of counsel for both parties advising the Court that no 
better factual decision could be made if a trial was held. The District Court stated: 
Part of this is the parties' suggestion that I'm not going to get to any better 
decision if we have a trial. Counsel seem to agree on that. I was really 
prepared when I came in here to say go find some more evidence of intent, 
but I think both counsel are saying we can't. 
Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 6:10-15 (March 31, 2015). 
The District Court considered the evidence before it, determined there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law 
and without extrinsic evidence. 
As will be addressed more fully below, even if the District Court had considered 
the documents Appellant later brought to the District Court's attention and now argues 
should have been considered, the District Court would have come to the same conclusion 
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and granted summary judgment to Respondent. As discussed below the District Court 
did come to the same conclusion after the Appellants filed their Motion to Amend 
Complaint on April 16, 2014. 
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motions to Amend Complaint, Nor Did the District Court Abuse its 
Discretion by Excluding Evidence Purportedly of the Intent of the 
Temporary Easement. 
Rule 15( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time 
within twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend a 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires, and the court may 
make such order for the payment of costs as it deems proper. A party shall 
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within ten (10) days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. 
I.R.C.P. 15(a). "A court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, 
this Court asks: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with 
any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 
(2001). 
The Supreme Court in Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 
Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) stated "[t]he twin purposes behind the rule are to allow 
claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings 
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue. 
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It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether to allow a party to 
amend its complaint after a responsive pleading has been served. [I]n the interest of 
justice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint." Carl H 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 13 3 Idaho 866, 993 P .2d 1197 ( 1999) (Internal 
citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
interpreting the comparable federal rule, stating: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, 
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 
cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to 
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely 
given 
Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 346, 33 P.3d 816, 820 
(2001) (citing Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 
993 P.2d 1197 (1999)). 
Appellants filed their Motions to Amend Complaint on the basis of the discovery 
of allegedly new evidence. The "new evidence" was more than fifteen years old at the 
point of Appellants' Motion to Amend. All of the allegedly "new evidence" was available 
to Appellants before and since the institution of this suit. All of the allegedly "new 
evidence" was part of the public records of either the USFS or Blaine County. 
Appellants, in essence, argue that the District Court wrongly denied their Motion 
to Amend Complaint and that the District Court should have considered these documents 
to interpret the Easement of Access. However, as discussed above, it is evident the 
District Court did not find the Easement of Access was ambiguous. In fact, the District 
Court determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law as ascertained from the 
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Easement of Access' plain language without the aid of extrinsic evidence. Hoch v. 
Vance, 155 Idaho 636,315 P.3d 824 (2013). 
It would have been inappropriate for the District Court to consider extrinsic 
evidence given the findings made on summary judgment - all of which were made as a 
matter of law. 
a. Appellants' April 2014 Motion to Amend Complaint. 
Appellants' April 2014 Motion to Amend cited to the allegedly "new evidence" 
which included the Woodcock Easement, the Special Use Application and Report, and an 
August 11, 1998 letter from Blaine County to the USFS. R. Vol. I, pp. 121-125, 130-142. 
Appellant alleged Ms. Wescott was an intended beneficiary under the Woodcock 
Easement. R. Vol. I, pp. 126-129. Respondent objected to the motion to amend on the 
grounds that the documents relied upon by the Appellants were never incorporated into 
the Woodcock Easement and the Woodcock Easement was not permanent. R. Vol. I., pp. 
149-151. 
At oral argument, on May 5, 2015, the District Court considered each of the 
documents attached to the proposed Amended Complaint. In denying Appellants' 
Motion to Amend Complaint, the District Court appropriately noted the only grantee to 
the Woodcock easement were Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock; Ms. Wescott was not a 
named beneficiary; and the intent surrounding the Woodcock Easement did not matter, 
but what mattered is what the USFS actually granted. Transcript of Court's Rulings and 
Remarks, 4:23- 6:2 (May 5, 2014). 
The District Court also concluded the Woodcock Easement was not permanent, 
on the basis that it allowed for the rights granted under the Woodcock Easement to be 
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assigned or transferred. Id. at 6:25-7: 18. The District Court stated such language would 
not be required if the Woodcock Easement was permanent. Id. 
The District Court clearly perceived the granting of the Motion to Amend as one 
of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason. The District Court's oral rulings on May 5, 2014, clearly 
demonstrate the District Court considered each of Appellants' arguments and determined 
such an amendment would be futile. 
The District Court stated: 
The only grantee of the [the Woodcock Easement], we'll call it an 
easement, the Exhibit B to the amended complaint, Instrument 442116, 
and I'll try and refer to this as Exhibit B to the amended complaint, the 
only grantee is Woodcocks. Ms. Wescott is not a grantee. She's not a 
named beneficiary. That's problem one. So, at best, she has an argument 
that I am an intended beneficiary and I have the right to enforce this 
easement as against someone else if push comes to shove. That someone 
else is going to be the United States .... 
And the third part of that is the Forest Service and/or the United States is 
not a party to this, so whatever evidence we gather of Woodcocks' intent 
and the government's intent as expressed to Blaine County or the intent 
that might be gleaned from the parties and Mr. Manwaring saying we can 
present evidence of all these people's intent, that matters not. What 
matters is what the government did and what they put in the deed. 
And I can take evidence for weeks on what everybody intended and what 
they wanted to do, and this case can wind up in federal court in 10 or 15 or 
20 or 30 or 50 years, and a federal judge can take a real good look at this 
and say it was nice of Judge Elgee to look at this problem and try and 
solve it for Ms. Wescott, but the government, the United States 
government, wasn't a party, didn't appear, and the Judge is trying to read 
between the lines -- Judge Elgee was trying to read between the lines and 
come up with what everybody intended. Nice try. I have a different 
opinion. The government has title to this property and is free to do 
what they want with it. The government retains the right to cancel the 
easement, it expires, whatever. 
That brings up a couple other points. Even on its face, if I -- if I heard 
additional evidence, the [Woodcock Easement] says it expires. And we 
can argue about what that means, and I can come up with my conclusions 
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about what that means and, like I say, the federal government 20 years 
from now in a federal court, a different judge might have a different 
opinion, and that's what's going to control. 
The deed also says that it is to the Woodcocks for a length of time. It 
does not say that it's permanent. It does not say that it runs with the 
land. And Mr. Manwaring, when he points to Part C of that, it says, "The 
rights granted under this easement can be transferred or assigned ... ," and I 
want to underline those words, "can be transferred or assigned," means 
that someone later can do something different, but it isn't done 
permanently now, and it would have to be done in the future by someone 
who is an owner. They may transfer or assign. That language would 
not be necessary if the easement was permanent and ran with the 
land. I know enough about easements to know that. We wouldn't have 
to be here arguing about whether it ran with the land. 
My point is, is that it's a question when it expires. It's a question whether 
it's permanent so long as it's used -- it says so long as it's used for a 
personal residence. To me, that's not permanent. You can argue that it is. 
But if I quieted title, I would be leaving Ms. Wescott with another 
question. If I said it doesn't expire, that's a maybe, also. If I said it runs 
with the land, that's a maybe, also. If I concluded that Blaine County's 
intent mattered or that the Forest Service's intent mattered outside the 
terms of this deed that is proposed, Exhibit B, or this grant of easement, 
this 442116, if I go outside of that easement and say here's what the 
parties intended and this was what got done and this was what was coming 
down the pike, no matter what I do here, I am simply switching the 
question from a cloud on Mr. Manwaring's client's title to switching 
and leaving questions and clouds on the title of Ms. Wescott and 
saying, well, you've got an easement, good luck, the problem is now 
yours. You've got some sort of easement from the United States, nobody 
is sure whether it's going to expire, nobody is sure what this 33 feet refers 
to, nobody is sure if it includes you in the reference, whether you're a 
direct beneficiary or an intended sidecar beneficiary or whether you just 
merely seem to benefit from it, but it can't be enforced in your name. It 
certainly can't be enforced against the government by Ms. Wescott, 
because the government is not a party . ... 
There are more questions that I could probably resolve and come up 
with answers about, but I don't have the authority over the United 
States to say this is what they intended, this is what they did, and I get 
to bind them to anything. That's the first and foremost problem. 
But these other problems or issues simply point up that there is nothing 
definite here with regard to the easement that -- this Exhibit B that the 
government gave. It is not permanent, and if it's argued that it is, that's, at 
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best, questionable. Who it runs to, whether it runs with the land, those are, 
at best, questions. Woodcocks' intent, Blaine County's intent, those aren't 
going to bind the government. 
So, for all those reasons -- and let me see if there are any other ones 
that I want to address -- I don't think granting the amended 
complaint and hearing more evidence solves the problem. That's really 
the long and short of it. ... 
The motion to vacate the trial is based on new evidence and an amended 
complaint. I cannot see that filing the amended complaint is going to help. 
The case was held open to see if Mr. Manwaring could solve the 
problem -- or when I say the case was left open, I said in my 
discussion -- I went back and read the transcript from March 31st, 
and what I think I wanted to leave open were two things. One, can 
Mr. Manwaring go to the Forest Service and actually get something 
that is permanent and that unquestionably solves the problem. And 
Mr. Manwaring is saying, Judge, I'll represent to you that's a 
possibility. And I don't want to foreclose that if it is a possibility . ... 
So I'll deny the motion to file the amended complaint. I will leave open -
- and this is what I left open before and I didn't know how you wanted to 
resolve it. or whether there's any reason to have a trial. 
Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014, pp. 4-10, 12-15 
( emphasis added). 
"The Court reviews the process the district court used to reach its decision rather 
than the decision itself. [W]here the trial court has exercised such discretion after a 
careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and 
without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, [the Court] will not 
disturb that action. Because this is a process oriented review, if a district court fails to 
enumerate its reasons for a discretionary decision, and the reasons are not obvious from 
the record, the Court will remand the case." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 
Idaho 749,756,331 P.3d 491,498 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
As the foregoing recitation of the record reveals, the District Court fully 
enumerated its reasons for its discretionary decision and amply demonstrated the futility 
-20-
of the amendment. Appellants simply sought to replace the USFS Wescott Easement 
with the Woodcock Easement in the Complaint. The District Court correctly concluded 
this exchange of evidence and allegations would be futile because the Woodcock 
Easement "does not say that it's permanent." Transcript of Court's Rulings and 
Remarks, May 5, 2014, 7:1. 
For the same reason, the District Court correctly denied Appellants' Motion to 
Amend because the claim that the Woodcock Easement was "permanent" was expressly 
invalid, as a matter of law. The District Court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and perceived the issue as one 
of discretion. 
b. Appellants' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint 
Two weeks prior to trial, Respondent provided 100 pages of documents to the 
Appellant, which were not relevant to the equitable issues to be tried and were public 
record. The Appellant immediately renewed its Motion to Amend the Complaint on the 
basis that two documents provided additional evidence of the intent of the parties to the 
Easement of Access. The two additional documents were a hearsay letter from Mr. 
Odmark to the USFS dated the same date as the application by the Woodcocks to the 
USFS and a hearsay Staff Report to Blaine County Board of Commissioners. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 216-245, 261-263. Both documents were part of the public record of either the USFS 
or Blaine County. 
The Appellants' argument below and here on appeal is that the District Court 
should have considered this extrinsic hearsay evidence to assist the Court in interpreting 
the Easement of Access. The District Court heard oral argument from Appellants on July 
23, 2014 just prior to the trial. 
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Appellants argued, for the first time, the layman's term of "permanent" as 
opposed to the legal term of "permanent" was different - i.e. there was some ambiguity 
as to what "permanent" meant. Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014, 
15:12-16. The Appellants further argued that no easement could be permanent because a 
theoretical earthquake could block an easement. Id. at 16: 19-17:4. 
The Court heard Appellants' arguments about the withholding of documents and 
agreed with Appellants that they were withheld, however, the District Court found, in the 
exercise of its discretion, the late production was not prejudicial, because "when Odmark 
used the term permanent it doesn't matter what he contemplated or what he intended or 
what he thought he might get or what the forest service might do. He used the term 
permanent, and to me, permanent means permanent. Doesn't mean permanent for a 
while." Id. at 29:13-24. 
The Court again reached the identical express legal conclusion it had reached 
when ruling two previous occasions: (i) on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and 
(ii) on Appellants' Motion to Amend Complaint, wherein the District Court stated: 
I don't think my position's changed ... when/if Blaine County and the 
United States Forest Service provide a permanent access. So in my view, 
and I've ruled on this, the easement that came from the forest service was 
not permanent. It is not permanent, and no amount of - I tend to agree 
with Mr. Trout here, no amount of discovery of is going to change the face 
of [the Woodcock Easement]. And my position hasn't changed from my 
permanent - or excuse me, from my previous ruling that the rest of it is all 
periphery. What was intended, what was discussed, what people wanted, 
whether they were public hearings, what Odmark expected, what Blaine 
County thought, that doesn't matter. What happened was the forest 
service did not grant a permanent easement. I think that is a matter 
oflaw." 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014 29:25-30: 16. 
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The District Court again affirmed its earlier decision in the cross-motions for 
summary judgment when discussing the admission of the USFS Press Release, PL' s 
Exhibit 8, by stating, "Doesn't affect, even if it would have been produced earlier or 
obtained earlier, doesn't affect the nature of the easement the forest service granted, 
and those determinations the Court made from the face of the easement, not from 
what people intended, not from public comment, not from what was solicited or 
requested ... the [Woodcock Easement] stands on its own, the easement from the 
forest service, and I think its limited from its own terms." Transcript on Appeal, July 
23, 2014, 57:3-12. 
The District Court further demonstrated it had previously considered the 
documents which Appellants argue should have been considered to determine the intent 
of the parties to the Easement of Access. The District Court stated at the conclusion of 
the trial, 
[t]he fact is those are not permanent easements by the forest service, 
as a matter of law. I'm not going back on that. I feel fairly firm in that 
ruling. Temporary easement is anybody's guess. They all saw something 
coming from the forest service which I think they all hoped would solve 
their problem. I think it's fairly evident, and one can glean from the intent 
in all those documents and things that they all saw something, but what 
they got didn't fix the problem, didn't grant permanent access. That was 
the word Odmark used. If it's permanent, then I think it would have 
solved the problem, but it wasn't, the problem exists." 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, 126:3-15. The District Court's denial of the 
Appellants' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint was not an abuse of discretion, as the 
amendment would have been, and remains, futile. 
c. The District Court's Ruling, if in error, was Harmless Error. 
Even if the District Court's denial of Appellants' Motion to Amend and Renewed 
Motion to Amend was in error, it was a harmless error. "In civil cases, I.R.C.P. 61 states 
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that unless the error appears inconsistent with substantial it is not grounds for 
reversal and that court must disregard error in the does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. This Court has also stated that if an error did 
not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result of the trial, the 
error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto ins. Co .. 140 
Idaho 495. 95 P.3d 977 (2004). 
Appellant must also show that had the error not occurred "a different result would 
have been probable.'· Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 
(1986). Appellants have failed to show how the granting of the filing of an Amended 
Complaint would have provided for a different outcome. 
It is clear from the review of the proceedings below in this matter, the District 
Court considered all the evidence placed before it, and the denials on Appellants' Motion 
to Amend and Renewed Motion to Amend would not have, and did not affect substantial 
rights of the Appellants. 
III. Appellants' Argument that the Easement is Unenforceable and Void 
for Lack of an Adequate Legal Description is Raised for the First 
Time on Appeal, and Fails as a Matter of Law. 
The Court Trial held on July 23, 2014 was limited only to equities as 
acknowledged by Appellants' counsel. The Appellants argue that the lack of an adequate 
legal description is an "equitable legal principle" which voids the Easement of Access. 
Appellants' Brief, p. 21. The Appellants attempted merger of equitable principles and 
legal principles in its argument is inappropriate. Furthermore, Appellant asserts the legal 
principles applicable to a legal description required in a purchase and sale agreement are 
to be applied identically to easement descriptions. Appellant's argument is not supported 
by settled principles in Idaho law. 
-24-
a. Equitable Principles are Distinct from Legal Principles. 
Equitable principles are "based on a system of rules and principles which 
originated in England as an alternative to the harsh rules of common law and which were 
based on what was fair in a particular situation. One sought relief under this system in 
courts of equity rather than in courts of law. The term "equity" denotes the spirit and 
habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men 
with men." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 6th ed., West 1990) 
(citing Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Development, 11 Cal.3d 313, 113 
Cal.Rptr. 374, 380, 521 P.2d 110 (1974)). 
Meanwhile, legal principles are distinguishable from equity and may be founded 
in statutes as passed by the legislature. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. defines "Legal" 
as: 
1. Conforming to the law; according to law; required or permitted by law; 
not forbidden or discountenanced by law; good and effectual in law; of or 
pertaining to the law; lawful; 
2. Proper or sufficient to be recognized by the law; cognizable in the 
courts; competent or adequate to fulfill the requirements of the law; 
3. Cognizable in courts of law, as distinguished from courts of equity; 
construed or governed by the rules and principles of law, in 
contradistinction to rules of equity. With the merger in most states of law 
and equity courts, this distinction generally no longer exists.; 
4. Posited by the courts as the inference or imputation of the law, as a 
matter of construction, rather than established by actual proof; e.g., legal 
malic; and 
5. Created by law. 
Black's Law Dictionary 892 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 6th ed., West 1990). As previously 
discussed, the District Court's interpretation of the Easement of Access as an 
unambiguous document, is a matter oflaw and not equity. 
-25-
The trial was limited solely to equitable issues - that is whether the cloud on Lot 7 
was equitable or not. The Appellants' argument, now raised for the first time on appeal, 
seeks to blur the distinction between the legal principle of interpretation of a document 
and the equitable principle of fairness. This blurring argument was neither raised nor 
pled before, or during the trial held. 
b. Appellants' Argument is Raised for the First Time on Appeal 
and Should Not be Considered. 
Appellants raise this legal issue for the first time on appeal. The District Court 
below determined, as a matter of law, the intent of the parties as ascertained from the 
plain language of the Easement of Access. Appellants did not raise the legal issue of the 
statute of frauds, nor did the Appellants raise the legal issue of a valid legal description. 
After the District Court determined the intention of the parties as a matter of law 
on summary judgment, the District Court limited the trial to one of equity, i.e. what is the 
"particular use or harm that's coming to Mr. Kirk other than the possibility, which is the 
same possibility Ms. Wescott has, the possibility that at some point in the future, she 
needs access across Kirk's lot?" Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, 122:4-9. 
Appellants' argument should not be considered because "[t]he longstanding rule 
of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on 
appeal." Fernandez v. Aevermann, No. 34089, 2008 WL 9468649, at *2-3 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Aug. 12, 2008) (citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 
(1991) ). The Court in Fernandez v. Aevermann went on to explain the rationale as first 
stated by the Supreme Court of the Territory ofldaho in 1867 as 
It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a party 
to go into court and slumber, as it were, on [a] defense, take no exception 
to the ruling, present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to 
present [the] defense, that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the 
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appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the purpose of an appeal 
and make the supreme court one for deciding questions of law in the first 
instance. 
Id ( citing Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867) ). 
The Appellants chose to sit on the blurred argument of "equitable legal principle", 
which argument was not presented to the District Court. Rather, Appellant now poses it 
to the Supreme Court as a newly conceived and newly invented phrase of "equitable legal 
principle." The Appellants are asking this Court to decide this legal issue in the first 
instance. 
The issue of whether the Easement of Access is void for lack of an adequate legal 
description was not before the District Court as a legal principle. The Easement of 
Access is a written document, and "[t]he legal effect of an unambiguous \vritten 
document must be decided by the trial court as a question oflaw.'' lvfachado v. Ryan, 153 
Idaho 212,280 P.3d 715 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
This issue of whether the easement is void for lack of an adequate legal 
description, or not, would require the District Court to interpret the document applying a 
legal standard and not an equitable standard. The Appellants failed to present any 
argument to the District Court, prior to the trial on equitable issues, that the Easement of 
Access was "void for lack of an adequate legal description" as argued in Appellants' 
Brief. 
This fusion of "equitable legal principle" issue appears for the first time in 
Appellant's opening Brief. The new argument is triggered only by Appellant Mr. Kirk's 
testimony as a layperson with no expertise in easements at a trial held to determine the 
equitable issues. 
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Appellants now seek to use this testimony, admitted by the District Court solely 
for consideration of equitable principles, to support an argument based purely upon legal 
principles which were neither raised prior to the trial nor by a motion for reconsideration. 
Appellants' argument should not be considered as being raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
c. The Easement of Access is Not Void for Lack of an Adequate 
Legal Description 
The Court must determine whether the Easement of Access meets the rule as 
stated by this Court in Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 270 P.2d 825 (1954). Each of 
Appellants' cases cited in support of their legal argument relates to a purchase and sale 
agreement with regards to the purchase or prospective purchase of property. The 
Appellants' recitation to cases which discuss a legal description contained within a 
purchase and sale agreement is inapplicable to the matter at hand. 
A simple review of the legal principles applicable to legal descriptions in a 
purchase and sale agreement as contrasted with the legal principles applicable to 
descriptions within easements reveals that well settled Idaho law has two distinctly 
different standards. 
In Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 270 P.2d 825 (1954), the Idaho Supreme Court 
adopted the general rule as stated in Inge/son v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 272 N.W. 270 
(1937) with respect to easement descriptions as follows, "[i]n describing an easement, all 
that is required is a description which identifies the land which is the subject of the 
easement, and expresses the intention of the parties." The Idaho Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed the rule as stated in Quinn v. Stone, in 1992 in Phillips Industries, Inc. v. 
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Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706 (1992), and as late as 2012 in Machado v. Ryan, 
153 Idaho 212,280 P.3 715 (2012). 
In Quinn v. Stone, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed testimony from two 
civil engineers who had examined the descriptions of the ditches and were specifically 
asked to opine as to whether or not they could establish the ditches. Both engineers 
affirmatively represented they could establish the ditches based upon the descriptions 
provided. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment, which found 
the appellants had abandoned the easement and that they had exhausted their rights under 
the easement, and remanded with instructions to "determine, and definitely described, the 
course and distance of the present north easterly ditch, and the second ditch West and 
then north to be constructed; the right-of-way for ingress and egress and the power line." 
Quinn v. Stone, supra. 
The Idaho Supreme Court further stated the rule with respect to easements in 
Idaho, "where conveyance of the right-of-way does not definitely fix its location, the 
grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way within the limits 
of the grant." Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243 (1954) (citing 28 C.J.S., Easements,§ 80a, 
page 760) ( emphasis added). 
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Forrest Weaver Farm, Inc., l 03 Idaho 180, 646 
P.2d 422 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court further affirmed the rule adopted in the State 
of Idaho, stating, "Although the contract does not specify the exact location of additional 
pipelines, Northwest's choice of route is limited by the rule '(w)here a conveyance of a 
right of way does not definitely fix its location, the grantee is entitled to a convenient, 
reasonable, and accessible way within the limits of the grant.' In light of these 
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authorities, the multiple line grant cannot be~ held void for want of definiteness." 103 
Idaho 180, 182, 646 P .2d 422, 424 (1982) ( emphasis added). 
Here, the grant of the Easement of Access clearly identifies the land which is the 
subject of the easement, that is a "25 foot wide Easement of Access ... over the Southeast 
corner of Lot 7 of Block 1 of the Glassford Heights Sub[division]." R. Vol. I., p. 13. The 
grant of the Easement of Access goes on to describe the intention of the parties as being 
" ... for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford Heights Sub[division]." Id The description is 
adequate and is not void for lack of an adequate legal description. 
IV. The District Court Properly Interpreted the Easement. 
Appellants argue the Easement of Access should be quitclaimed back to Lot 7 
because it never came into effect, or in other words, there was no need for it and therefore 
it somehow expired. As discussed above in Section I supra regarding the District Court's 
granting of summary judgment to Respondent, the District Court never found the 
Easement of Access to be ambiguous. As a result, the District Court correctly determined 
the intention of the parties as a matter oflaw as ascertained from the Easement of Access' 
plain language and without the aid of extrinsic evidence. The District Court correctly 
followed the rule as affirmed in Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 315 P.3d 824 (Idaho 
2013). 
Appellants then argue there is a condition precedent to the Easement of Access 
from being granted to Lot 8 - that is the Easement of Access does not exist unless certain 
conditions exist. This argument is simply incorrect, because the Warranty Deed states: 
For Value Received Leif Odmark, sole and separate property 
Hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys 
unto 
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James A McElveen and Ann B. McElveen, husband and wife 
whose address is: PO Box 3110, Sun Valley, ID 83353 
Hereinafter called the Grantee, the following described premises situated 
in Blaine County, ID to-wit: 
Lot 8 in Block 1 of GLASSFORD HEIGHTS SUBDIVSION, according 
to the official plat thereof, recorded as Instrument No. 115702, records of 
Blaine County, Idaho. 
Together with a temporary Easement of Access described in the attached 
Exhibit 1. 
R. Vol. I, p. 12. 
Ms. Wescott didn't just receive the second paragraph of the Easement of Access, 
but received the Easement of Access in its entirety. 
The Easement of Access can be separated into two clauses: Paragraph 1 and 
Paragraph 2. Paragraph 1 calls for receipt of permanent access from either Blaine County 
or the USFS across USFS lands to Lot 8. Within thirty days after receiving permanent 
access, Lot 8 must quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7. Ms. Wescott has not 
received permanent access, so no duty arises under Paragraph 1. 
Paragraph 2 of the Easement of Access describes when the Easement of Access 
becomes effective, or like a light bulb, turned on. Until the owner of Lot 8 receives a 
written denial of access from the USFS, the Easement of Access is not effective, or is off. 
However, upon receipt of a written denial, the Easement of Access is turned on. Lot 8 
may then access the property across the Easement of Access until Blaine County agrees 
to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. After the completion of a driveway from Jones 
Lane to Lot 8, Lot 8 must then quitclaim the Easement of Access to Lot 7. As found by 
the District Court, access from Blaine County is no longer legally possible, due to the 
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action of Appellant's predecessor in interest having sought, and obtained, a vacation of 
Jones Lane by the County. 
As the Appellants urged the District Court, the Appellants now urge this Court to 
focus solely on the second paragraph of the Easement of Access. If the Court were to 
focus only on the second paragraph of the Easement of Access, the Court would reach the 
same conclusion, and that is that the Easement of Access is valid, has not expired, and is 
still available to Ms. Wescott in the event she receives written denial from the USPS. 
The second paragraph states, in its entirety: 
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by 
the owner ( of Lot 8) of written denial by the USPS for the owner ( of Lot 
8) to access Lot 8 across USPS lands on the East side of the property line 
( of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall 
remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 
8 from Jones Lane. The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of 
Access back to Lot 7 within one year or upon completion of the driveway, 
whichever occurs first. 
R. Vol. I, p. 13. 
In order to properly interpret the Easement of Access, the Court must review the 
Easement of Access in its entirety. However, after interpreting the first paragraph and 
determining Ms. Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USPS is not permanent, nor is the 
Woodcock Easement, an interpretation of the second paragraph simply describes when 
the easement becomes effective, and the duties after the easement becomes effective, or 
turned on. 
As acknowledged by the Appellants - the Easement of Access is either on or off. 
Appellants' Brief, p. 26. In order for the Easement of Access to turn "on," Ms. Wescott 
must receive a written denial of access from the USPS, otherwise the Easement of Access 
is "off." In other words, the Easement of Access is currently not necessary for use. 
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However as recognized by the District Court, there is no guaranty that at some 
point in the future, Ms. Wescott or some future owner of Lot 8, won't receive a written 
denial from the USFS denying access across USFS lands. Simply because the Easement 
of Access is not currently necessary for use, does not mean that Ms. Wescott, or a 
successor in interest, does not have a valid easement. See Ko/ouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 
65, 813 P.2d 876 (1991) ("[W]here an easement has been created but no occasion has 
arisen for its use, the owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and such use will 
not be deemed adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need for 
the right of way arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner of the dominant tenement that 
the easement be opened and (3) the owner of the servient tenement refuses to do so.") 
The second sentence of the second paragraph of the Easement of Access goes on 
to provide how long the Easement of Access will remain "on" or "in effect." "This 
Easement of Access shall remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow 
access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane." R. Vol. I, p. 13. As the Appellants pointed out, Blaine 
County vacated Jones Lane at the request of the Appellants' predecessor in interest. 
Given the vacation by Blaine County, if the Easement of Access becomes "in effect" or 
"on," the Easement of Access must remain on or "in effect" perpetually. 
Finally, Appellants point to the last sentence of the second paragraph of the 
Easement of Access which requires Lot 8 to quitclaim the Easement of Access within one 
year, or upon the completion of the driveway. Appellants' argue that because (i) it has 
been more than one year since the Easement of Access was granted to Ms. Wescott and 
(ii) Ms. Wescott's driveway connects to the forest road easement, the Easement of 
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Access is no longer valid. Appellant's Brief, p. 27. The District Court considered these 
exact arguments below and addressed them as discussed in Section I supra. 
However, the last sentence of the second paragraph, when read in concert with the 
entirety of the Easement of Access, in particular the second paragraph, is exclusive of the 
USFS Easement, and suggests the Easement of Access to be quitclaimed within one year 
after the Easement of Access becomes active. 
Next, Appellants focus on the phrase "or upon completion of the driveway" 
contained in the last sentence of the second paragraph. Appellants cite to the fact that 
Ms. Wescott has a circular driveway that connects to the USFS Easement. Appellants' 
Brief, p. 27. Appellants asked the District Court below, and this Court, to make a finding 
or an assumption that the "driveway" discussed is the current driveway. The Appellants' 
argument regarding the driveway fails based upon the facts as presented to the District 
Court in the Appellants' Motion to Amend and Renewed Motion to Amend. The address 
of Respondent's property was originally 105 Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 13. 
It is nothing more than an assumption by the Appellants that the driveway 
contemplated in the Easement of Access exits onto the USFS Easement. Appellants fail 
to represent to the Court that the original plat of the subdivision provided for access to 
Lot 8 via Jones Lane. The driveway contemplated was from Jones Lane through the 
wetlands, and connecting to State Highway 75. R. Vol. I, p. 90. 
Likewise, the Appellants ignore the entire third sentence which states that the 
Easement of Access remains "in effect" until Blaine County allows access from Jones 
Lane to Lot 8. The District Court did not make the finding that the Easement of Access, 
nor Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed was ambiguous. Simply because Appellants' 
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interpretation is different than that of the District Court's interpretation, does not mean 
the District Court erred. The District Court properly determined the intent of the parties 
from the plain language of the document and without considering extrinsic evidence, all 
according to law. 
V. The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Determined 
Appellants Had Not Pursued the Case Frivolously. 
a. Respondent's Cross-Appeal was Timely. 
Appellant argues Respondent's Cross-Appeal was untimely. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 27-29. In order to determine whether Respondent's Cross-Appeal was timely filed, 
the Court must consider the timeline of events. 
August 25, 2015 Judgment Entered 
September 3, 2015 Respondent files Memorandum of Fees and Costs 
October 27, 2015 Hearing on Memorandum of Fees & Costs and Appellants' 
Motion to Disallow Fees & Costs 
November 3, 2015 Amended Judgment entered 
November 13, 2015 Appellants file Amended Notice of Appeal 
November 13, 2015 Respondent files Motion to Reconsider Fees & Costs 
pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B) of the I.R.C.P. 
January 26, 2015 Court denies Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Fees & 
Costs 
February 23, 2015 Appellant Files Notice of Cross Appeal 
March 3, 2015 Appellant files Amended Notice of Cross Appeal 
Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules states, 
A cross-appeal, as a matter of right, may be made only by physically filing 
the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district court or 
administrative agency within the 42 day time limit prescribed in Rule 14, 
as it applies to the judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is taken, 
or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal, 
whichever is later. 
Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules states: 
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right 
from the district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date 
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evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or 
order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or 
criminal action. The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in 
an action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, 
could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in 
the action ( except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure or motions regarding costs or attorney's fees), in which case the 
appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date 
of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. 
The District Court denied Respondent's request for attorney's fees on October 27, 
2015, finding the case was not brought frivolously. Appellant argues that the 42 days 
begins running from the entry of the Court's Amended Judgment on November 3, 2014. 
In support of this argument, Appellant relies on Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rule 
which states "which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or 
any judgment in the action (except motions ... regarding costs or attorneys fees)." 
Respondent isn't appealing from the Judgment entered which dismisses the 
Appellants' Complaint. Respondent is appealing from the District Court's denial of 
Respondent's attorney's fees. The District Court's order denying Respondent's 
attorney's fees were entered on November 3, 2014. This Order was entered after final 
judgment was entered in this matter. On November 13, 2014, just 10 days after the entry 
of the Court's Order, Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration, citing to Rule 
l l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
(B) Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any 
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the 
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry 
of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the 
trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall 
be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on 
any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59J, 60(a), 
or 60(b). 
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I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Respondent's motion, was as to an order made 
after final judgment, as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(7). Respondent's Motion 
for Reconsideration was a motion which "if granted, could affect any findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action" as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 
14. 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration asked the District Court to reconsider 
its finding that the Appellant had not pursued the case in violation of Idaho Statute § 12-
121. R. Vol. II., p. 58-64. If the District Court were to grant Respondent's motion, it 
would have affected the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment in this 
matter, and then the District Court would have had to consider what fees were 
appropriate to award to Respondent. 
The District Court heard Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on January 26, 
2015 and orally denied Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration the same day. 1 The 
day the Court entered the order denying Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, 
begins the running of the 42 day deadline. I.A.R. 14(a). The deadline for Respondent to 
file her notice of appeal was March 9, 2015. Respondent filed her notice of cross-appeal 
on February 23, 2015 and her Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 3, 2015, well 
within the timeline as set forth in I.A.R. 14(a) and I.A.R. 15. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Wescott's appeal. 
1 It is important to note, that even though Respondent requested a transcript of the 
January 26, 2015 hearing, one was not provided with the Record. Respondent is 
contemporaneously filing a Motion to Augment the Record to include the January 26, 
2015 hearing transcript. 
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b. Appellants' Case Was Brought and Pursued Frivolously. 
Appellants' cause of action below revolved around a single, simple question: Was 
the 2007 USFS Easement to Ms. Wescott permanent, or not? A detailed review of 
Appellants' Complaint clearly sets the stage for this question: 
10. On May 15, 2007, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest 
Service conveyed to Defendant Ann B. Wescott a 33' wide easement to 
access the Dominant Estate (the "Replacement Easement"). A true and 
correct copy of the Replacement Easement is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"Be" 
11. The Replacement Easement was intended to replace the Temporary 
Access Easement. 
12. On or about January 11, 2010 the Plaintiffs acquired title to the 
Servient Estate. 
13. The Temporary Access Easement expressly provides that the owner of the 
Dominant Estate will quitclaim the Temporary Access Easement back to the 
owner of the Servient Estate within thirty (30) days o f receipt of the Replacement 
Easement. 
14. Notwithstanding any other provision contained in the Temporary 
Access Easement, the express language of the Temporary Access 
Easement provides that, "The owner's of Lot 8 (the Dominant Estate) shall 
Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 (the Servient Estate) 
within one year or upon completion of the driveway, whichever comes 
first". 
15. Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Forest Service has conveyed 
the Replacement Easement to the Defendants and that it has been more 
than one year from the date the Temporary Access Easement was granted, 
Defendants have failed and refused to quitclaim the Temporary Access 
Easement to the owner of the Servient Estate. 
16. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment qmetmg title that the 
Temporary Access Easement is expired, void, terminated, and is no longer 
an encumbrance on the Plaintiffs' property. 
R. Vol. I., pp. 10-11. Appellants' entire Complaint was based upon the false assertion 
that the 2007 Easement from the USFS to Ms. Wescott was "permanent." 
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There was neither a factual nor legal basis for Appellants' Complaint, and as such 
the action was, and remains, frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation under Rule 
54(e)(l) and Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied Respondent's request for 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. "An award of attorney fees pursuant to J.C. § 
12-121 is discretionary and is subject to review and vacation only upon a showing of an 
abuse of discretion. See Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 131 Idaho 254, 
257, 953 P.2d 1363, 1366 (1998); Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass 'n v. Pulley, 125 
Idaho 237, 250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). Section 12-121 provides in part: "In any civil 
action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party .... " 
However, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) limits the discretion of the court to award attorney fees under 
this section by providing that "attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593,600, 990 P.2d 1204, 1211 (1999). 
First, the District Court erred by not determining Ms. Wescott was the prevailing 
party. To determine the prevailing party, the District Court simply needed to look at the 
request by the Appellants as stated in their Complaint: 
a. That this Court enter a final Decree and Order declaring the 
termination of the Temporary Access Easement and otherwise quieting 
Plaintiffs' title to the Temporary Access Easement and the whole of the 
Servient Estate. 
b. For an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees against any 
Defendant who answer and unsuccessfully defends against the relief 
sought by the Plaintiff. 
c. For other and further relief as the Court shall deem equitable. 
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R. Vol. I., p. 11. Judgment was entered as against the Appellants, dismissing their 
unfounded claims with prejudice. R. Vol. I., pp. 293-294. The District Court abused its 
discretion when it did not find Ms. Wescott was the prevailing party. 
Next, the Court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Wescott's request for 
fees outright. Appellants brought this action on the sole basis that Ms. Wescott's 2007 
Easement from the USFS was to be the "permanent" easement that replaced the 
Easement of Access across their property. However, in so alleging and arguing, 
Appellants disregarded the plain and, as admitted by the Appellants on summary 
judgment, unambiguous terms of the Easement of Access. Paragraph 1 of the Easement 
of Access required "permanent access across USFS Lands to Lot 8" prior to Lot 8 being 
required to quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7. 
Appellants' contention, as stated in the Complaint, never held any factual or legal 
validity. The 2007 Easement from the USFS is not "permanent", by any definition. The 
2007 Easement has a specific expiration date, plainly stated, on the face of the 
instrument. 
The specific facts of this case are distinguishable from the specific facts of the 
Bear Island Water Ass'n v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,874 P.2d 528 (1994), case, though the 
underlying reasoning is indistinguishable. In Bear Island, the Bear Island Water 
Association ("BIW A"), asserted both at the trial court and at the appellate court, that the 
well was connected to the water system and in use at the time of conveyance to Jefferson 
County. The well wasn't operational until November of 1988, more than a year after Lot 
9 was conveyed to Jefferson County. 
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The Supreme Court found that BIWA's factual assertion, which was essential to 
BIW A's easement claim "was clearly incorrect, and to pursue an appeal of the easement 
issue in reliance on this incorrect factual assertion was frivolous and unreasonable. 
Without this erroneous representation of the facts, BIWA's arguments for easement rights 
were clearly without foundation." Id. 
Similar to Shettel v. Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 938 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1997), 
the Appellants' pleadings and testimony were inconsistent. Appellant's pled that the 
USFS Easement was permanent. Of equal import, Appellants' factual assertion that Ms. 
Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USFS was intended to replace the Easement of 
Access was never factually correct, and wholly unsupported by any documentary or 
testimonial evidence. Appellant's contention was frivolous and unreasonable, and the 
District Court erred when it denied Respondent her attorney's fees. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant is entitled to her attorney's fees on appeal, because 
Appellants have pursued this appeal frivolously and unreasonably. In Shettel v. 
Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 938 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1997), the Magistrate Court, after 
the case having been remanded from the District Court, determined that Bamesberger 
acted unreasonably throughout the pretrial proceedings and discovery. The magistrate 
court also determined the Bamesbergers failed to present any evidence adequate to 
support their equitable doctrine claims. 
"An award of attorney fees for pursuit of an appeal is appropriate where the 
appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. An appeal should do more than simply invite the appellate court to second 
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guess a trial court on conflicting evidence." Shettel v. Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 222, 
938 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 
The Appellants in this matter are simply inviting the Supreme Court to second 
guess the District Court's rulings where there was no legal or factual foundation to 
support the filing of the Complaint. Appellants, excepting for a legal argument raised on 
the first time on appeal, are simply asking this Court to reinterpret the same evidence as 
presented to the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Respondent requests this Court affirm the District 
Court's decision dismissing Appellants' Complaint, and reverse the District Court's 
decision denying Respondent's attorney's fees below. Respondent further requests this 
Court grant Respondent attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
DATED: February 2, 2016 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 2, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document was forwarded addressed as follows in the manner stated 
below: 
Jed W. Manwaring, ISB No. 3040 
Christy A. Kaes, ISB No. 4852 
EV ANS KEANE, LLP 
1161 West River Street, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
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reservabls, resllictbls, easetnemi d recad, and easemenls vtsllle l4JOO the Jll8ITi;es, a,d that Glafflav.il warrant and defend lhe SIYl'ltt 
litm al darns~. 
Daled: Apli ~~ • 2000 
STATE OF klaro 
COUNTY OF 8lahe 
o, tis i 4 dayd Apli, 2(XX), befae me, a Nofay Ptm: i1 and tirsald S1a1e, petsooaly appeaed Leif O:hak, sdeand 
-~1fi;:,·~· .... -, ..... _,, . .-... --... -· 
~) 
Corrmission El<pires: 05'1504 
I JOLYNN ORAGI::. EX-OFFICIO RECORDER IN AND FOR 
SAID COUNTYANl>STA'.fE DUE HEREBY CERTIFYTHATTH_E. 
H)REGO!NG lSA FUl.tTRllEAND CORRE(i'COPY OFTfIA:l 
CE!~'!';'IIN . J~_s:n~~MEN'l43 {?lfi~>g D, IN MY OFFICl! AS 
IN::i ! RUMEN l NV -- --- ------·-··--a_::,,{ ________ _____ _ _ 
RECORDS OF BLAINE- COUNT Y, STATE OF l-DAHO. 
::?~l~?"~~~~D;GE ;5~"°'' ,·y.o,l'JC!O RECORDEP I 
Exhib/1:"1" 
105 Jones Lane 
This Warranty Deed shall include a temp::xary 25 foot wide Easement of fol::J::R:ss. ( See plat map-
E.xhi:lit 2) CNer1he Southeast cc.mer of Lot 7 of Block 1 of 1he Glassford Heights Sub for acress to Lot 8 
of !he Glassford Heights Sub. Vv'hen / if Blaine Coonty and Toe Uniled Slates Forest Servioo provx:le a 
permanent access across USFS Lands 1o Lot 8 , 111e owner of Lot 8 shaH Quitclaim 111e Easement of 
f.a:eas back 1o Lot 7 within 30 days of 'Mittel1 receipt !hereof. 
This Easement of kJ:sss shall beo:rne" In Eflect'' only upon receipt by the owner (of Lot 8) of 'Mitten 
denial by the USFS for the owner ( of Lot 8 ) to acress Lot 8 across USFS lands on !he East side of the 
prq)elty line ( of Lot 8 ) and beginning at 8end1 React This Easement of~ shall remain" In Effect" 
only until Blaine Couniy agrees 1o allow acress 1o Lot 8 from Jones Lane. Toe CM'l1e!'s of Lot 8 shal 
Quildaim the Easement of~ back 1o Lot 7 wilhin one year e< upon OOl11fl6lien ct the drM:Mtay, 
whichel,er OCCI.J'S 1irst 
GLASSFORD HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION ·t 
. IN H.E.S. 127 ...... ~~....!!"""" 
UNSURVEYED T5N. Rl7E, B.M., =·~-=-
BLAINE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Wfdb ~ M•,t• .. ~ ... .,\b NJ,re,~ttr,;, ., 
tlln-. (U• ht tt-.,. tttt n,contu•• et ff-t•r•• 
ri,llt4, t1fMI ~,...,. HSW\Ut •• lla-.Uhy lt111 
•w-l•tl.R,,t, u ~,. • .tlilo -~, ........... "'.,.~ 
i 
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